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Ledger’s Website Hacked to Redirect Crypto Payments

Ledger’s Website Hacked to Redirect Crypto Payments
  • Malicious JavaScript reached Ledger.com through a compromised Optimizely service.
  • Ledger says its hardware wallets and private keys were not affected.
  • The code could swap crypto addresses and steal payment card data.
  • Researchers have linked only small crypto transfers to the attackers so far.

Ledger’s security team, Ledger Donjon, confirmed on November 17 that its website served malicious code for part of November 16, after attackers compromised Optimizely, an A/B testing service embedded on Ledger.com and on the sites of at least 177 other organizations, including HSBC, Zoom, the BBC and Air France-KLM. The injected JavaScript could replace cryptocurrency addresses on a page or in a visitor’s clipboard, collect payment card details and attempt to exploit vulnerable iPhones. Ledger says the attack never reached its device security architecture or the private keys stored on its hardware wallets.

One editable code box, 178 websites

Optimizely Web Experimentation runs from a single script tag that pulls fresh experiment logic from the company’s servers every time a page loads, and that logic carries the same permissions as the site’s own code so it can rewrite headlines and buttons on the fly. The attacker placed a malicious loader inside Project JavaScript, a customer-editable code block that executes on every page carrying the snippet. Each affected brand therefore started serving the payload without anyone breaching its servers. Attackers recently used a similar route against mining-pool operator Luxor, breaking into a third-party fleet-management tool to change payout addresses on customer accounts.

Browser defenses were poorly placed to catch it. Sites using Optimizely normally allowlist its domains in their Content Security Policy, the rule set that decides which sources may run scripts, and they rarely apply integrity checks to testing tools because those scripts change every time a marketer edits an experiment.

A crypto clipper bundled with a card skimmer

Scott Helme, a security researcher and founder of the script monitoring service Report URI, reviewed 1,611 Optimizely scripts and found 188 compromised snippets tied to 178 organizations, a count he says may rise. Banks and financial firms made up the largest group on the list, with 32 organizations, followed by technology companies and retailers. Cybercrime intelligence firm HudsonRock supplied further evidence of the campaign.

What the code did Aimed at Evidence of harm
1Swapped wallet addresses BTC, ETH and EVM chains, SOL, TRX, TON, LTC, DOGE, BCH ● Funds received
2Skimmed payment cards Card number, expiry date, CVV ● Unconfirmed
3Took cookies and screenshots Session data, on-screen content ● Unconfirmed
4Pushed iOS exploits iPhones and iPads via Coruna and DarkSword kits ● No infections found

Source: Report URI research by Scott Helme

The address swap went beyond visible text and also rewrote addresses in forms, links and clipboard operations, so a visitor copying a wallet address from an affected page could paste one controlled by the attacker.

From a BBC script to cleanup in 17 hours

●
04:21 UTC start
First injection, in a script tied to the BBC website
●
13:43 UTC +9h 22m
Card skimmer added to the payload
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20:40 UTC +16h 19m
Mass removal of infected scripts begins
●
21:52 UTC +17h 31m
One known snippet still carries the code

Optimizely said an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product to add the code to customer projects. In an update at 01:02 UTC on November 17, the company said it had fixed the flaw, removed the injected code, secured the affected accounts and added protections against unauthorized code delivery, without describing the flaw itself.

The weak spot a Ledger screen cannot fix

A Ledger device displays the destination address on its own screen, which defeats malware that alters an address after the user approves it. If a clipboard swap has already replaced the recipient’s details, however, the device will faithfully show the attacker’s address, and the only safeguard is to compare it with a source the browser never touched, such as the recipient’s own wallet app. Ledger.com works mainly as a storefront, so the card skimmer was arguably the more direct risk for its visitors, although no one has confirmed it ran on Ledger’s checkout pages.

$7,040 traced to attacker wallets

Researchers counted roughly $7,040 received by attacker-linked addresses as of 19:25 UTC on November 16, while software supply-chain security firm StepSecurity arrived at about $6,600. Some of those addresses were active before the campaign, so part of that sum may be unrelated. There is no loss figure for Ledger customers and no count of Ledger.com visitors who loaded the script.

Anyone who visited an affected site on November 16 should check that day’s crypto transfers against the intended destination, review card statements and install current iOS security updates. Ledger says users have no reason to replace devices or reset recovery phrases solely because they visited its website.

Fifth vendor-linked incident since 2020

A 2020 database breach exposed Ledger customer contact details, and the December 2023 compromise of Ledger Connect Kit, a code library used by decentralized apps, cost users at least $600,000. This year brought a Global-e payment processor breach in January and tampered devices sold through Southeast Asian resellers in October, with Ledger’s own chips and servers intact each time.

Script inventories are now a card-network rule

The skimming component falls under rules card networks already enforce. Requirements 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 of PCI DSS version 4.0, mandatory since March 31, 2025, oblige merchants to keep an inventory of every script on their payment pages, justify each one and detect unauthorized changes. Card-accepting brands among the 178 affected organizations may have to show their acquiring banks whether their monitoring caught the change on November 16. Some may move testing to the server instead, an option Optimizely already sells as Feature Experimentation, where no third-party code reaches the visitor’s browser.